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 Discussion/ Diskussion
 Clarifying the Record: A Comment
 by
 Victor P. Goldberg
 In their recent article in this journal, Boudreaux and Ekelund [1987] have
 presented a distorted characterization of some of my work on the economics of
 regulation. The editor of this journal has graciously offered me the opportunity
 to respond to their criticisms and to redress some ambiguities, real or imagined,
 in my earlier work.
 Boudreaux and Ekelund get off to a bad start by posing a false dichotomy.
 Is the entire regulatory process, they ask, to be explained in terms of an
 efficiency-increasing response to market failures or as an efficiency-reducing
 result of rent-seeking activities by politician regulators? I am supposed to
 subscribe to the former position; they stake out the latter. They then go on to
 characterize the debate as one between "those in favor of [apparently, me], and
 those opposed to [apparently, them] government regulation" (Boudreaux and
 Ekelund [1987, p. 538]).
 My first objection is that the two varieties of explanation are not mutually
 exclusive. One could argue that electricity is better provided by a regulated
 utility than by an unregulated market and at the same time acknowledge that
 the politicians, regulators, and regulatees will all attempt to use the political
 system to their advantage. Their argument is akin to asserting that publication
 of a scholarly research article can be explained either by the author's interest
 in disseminating its contents or alternatively as an attempt to enhance his future
 income given the compensation schemes adopted by modern universities. That
 content matters does not mean that financial rewards are entirely irrelevant.
 And vice versa.
 My second objection is that I didn't say it. In fact, I provided what seemed
 like a pretty clear disclaimer: "It is important to reiterate that we are not
 making a case for regulation. This essay might more appropriately be looked
 upon as 'the case against the case against regulation.' "(Goldberg [1976,
 p. 444]). I intended neither to justify regulation nor to predict its natural emer-
 gence. 1 My intent was to explore the types of problems that would confront
 1 "The contemporary idea that government regulation may evolve naturally and
 optimally as a low-cost response to market failure is perhaps best expressed in the
 challenging work of Goldberg, although we do not attribute all elements of our simple
 characterization to him" (Boudreaux and Ekelund [1987, p. 540]).
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 either a regulator or parties to a private contract and their implications for the
 organization of economic behavior. In this sense, the exercise is in the spirit of
 Coase'S [1960, p. 18] discussion of institutional choice in a world in which
 transaction costs are not zero:
 ". . . [T]he problem is one of choosing the appropriate social arrangement for dealing with
 harmful effects. All solutions have costs and there is no reason to suppose that govern-
 ment regulation is called for simply because the problem is not well handled by the market
 or the firm. Satisfactory views on policy can only come from a patient study of how, in
 practice, the market, firms and governments handle the problem of harmful effects. . . .
 It is my belief that economists, and policymakers generally, have tended to overestimate
 the advantages which come from governmental regulation. But this belief, even if justi-
 fied, does not do more than suggest that government regulation should be curtailed. It
 does not tell us where the boundary line should be drawn. This, it seems to me, has to
 come from a detailed investigation of the actual results of handling the problem in
 different ways."
 While Coase's paper has sometimes been misinterpreted as an argument for
 relying upon private markets, it is clear that he draws no such implications. The
 question as to why he (and I) have been misinterpreted is a perplexing one on
 which I can shed little light.
 I was particularly taken aback by the criticism that we new institutionalists
 "discount heavily the prospect that regulation engenders rent-seeking activity"
 (Boudreaux and Ekelund [1987, p. 539]). I did not discount it. I explicitly
 assumed the problem away in order to focus on a different set of issues:
 ". . . We shall assume throughout that the agent is a faithful representative of his princi-
 pal's interests. While a wildly unrealistic assumption, the benevolent agent, like the
 benevolent dictator of traditional welfare economics, is a convenient analytical construct.
 This assumption does, however, preclude discussion of the politics of regulation - partic-
 ularly the charge that regulators are susceptible to political influence by producer inter-
 ests." (Goldberg [1976, p. 430]).
 Boudreaux and Ekelund [1987, pp. 545-552] invoke Schumpeter [1942]
 in their criticism of the new institutionalism. That really hurts. The whole
 notion of "protecting the right to serve" was developed in a Schumpeterian
 framework, complete with quotation and effusive praise (Goldberg
 [1976, p. 435]). That was one flank I thought particularly safe. Schumpeter
 emphasized that various restrictions which appeared inefficient in a static con-
 text need not be inefficient in a dynamic context. There is nothing in Schum-
 peter's argument - either theoretical or empirical - which would lead one to
 conclude that only "private" restrictions could possibly be efficient in Schum-
 peter's eyes. Yet that is the interpretation Boudreaux and Ekelund [1987, pp.
 545-546] propose.
 Perhaps the central message of the new institutionalists (in which group I
 would classify Coase) is the richness of institutional alternatives. A corollary is
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 that the distinction between public and private can be unclear. Is government
 enforcement of a patent system a private or public arrangement? Must Schum-
 peter be interpreted as saying that a world in which ideas are protected by trade
 secrets and inventions are contracted for, is a world that is inevitably superior
 to one in which the government provides patents? I choose this example delib-
 erately since, as I noted in Goldberg [1976, p. 435], patent protection is analyt-
 ically the same as protection of a right to serve a market. The "same" govern-
 ment that hands out patents hands out utility franchises. How can one conclude
 on a priori grounds that they will do it better in the one context than the other?
 (To avoid further misinterpretation, I will answer this rhetorical question: one
 cannot.)
 BouDREAUxand Ekelund [1987, pp. 546-550] argue that Schumpeterian
 competition will eventually lead to the establishment of efficient contract terms.
 They switch gears abruptly, moving from the context of a public utility fran-
 chise to the relatively mundane problem of determining the optimal warranty
 length on a consumer contract. Here their paper gets very strange indeed. They
 begin: "Goldberg, in fact, uses the airline industry to show how consumers
 could fare better under regulation than under private contracting" (Bou-
 DREAUX and Ekelund [1987, p. 547]). Since I did not recall having become
 involved in the airline deregulation debate, I found this rather puzzling and
 returned to the source with some curiosity to see what I had written on the
 problem. Here it is:
 "... [W]hile the institutions of regulation can be manipulated in the producer's interest,
 so too can those of private contract. Indeed, the firms might have been better off (and
 the consumers worse off) under private contract. An unregulated airline industry, for
 example, might attain a rule stating that the development of a new route is the production
 of new knowledge and the developer should be granted an exclusive right to the route for
 some period of time (analogous to patent or copyright protection)." (Goldberg
 [1974, p. 473]).
 It is possible, I suppose, to interpret that statement as being consistent with
 their characterization. But it is, at best, unhelpful. Surely, they should have no
 difficulty accepting the proposition that firms might be better off if, instead of
 the government regulating airlines, it distributed exclusive rights to routes.
 They take issue with my argument as to why optimal warranty terms might
 not emerge in a competitive market (Goldberg [1974, pp. 485-491]). My argu-
 ment was an application of the lemon's model developed by Akerlof [1970].
 My discussion was sufficiently qualified so that I only suggested that it was
 possible that intervention by legislatures or the courts might result in better
 subsidiary contract terms (like the warranty) than would private contract.
 Nonetheless, the tone of my argument suggested (and that coincided with my
 beliefs at the time) that the intervention would be a good thing. I am much less
 sanguine about that today. The roots of this change are both a decreased faith
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 in the ability of courts and legislatures to do the job well and an increased faith
 in the ability of private parties to cope with, if not fully resolve, the problems.
 Courts and legislatures have learned how to justify intervention. But they have
 not seemed to learn how to intervene. They have not come to appreciate the
 subtleties in designing efficient contract terms. Moreover, there is some evi-
 dence that markets have resolved some of the problems tolerably well; see
 Priest [1981].
 So, I can plead at least a little bit guilty to one of their charges. But, for the
 remainder, save for one rather limp disclaimer, 2 they have badly misrepresent-
 ed my views. And to what end? They convert the entire Coasian agenda of
 understanding how alternative institutions work in an imperfect world to a
 simple ideological question: is regulation good or bad? Having done that, they
 then conclude that it is bad. While I am not averse to making policy judgments,
 I will reiterate that I did not take a position on that question.
 2 See the last clause in footnote 1.
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